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BY MILTON R. KONVITZ
**T WISHED to show," wrote Karl Pearson, "that the study of
A Alaimonides was traceable even in Spinoza's most finished
exposition of his philosophy."^ To the same efifect wrote Dr. M.
Joel in his Zur Genesis der LcJire Spinozas. ."Man weiss es heute,
dass Spinoza nicht oherflachlich, sondern aufs genauesfe vertraut
war mit den Schriften des Mainionides. Man inuss aher die Lak-
tiire dieser Schriften nicht beschrdnken auf die Jugendzeit des
Splnozas, so dass ihni etzua hlosse Rciuiniscenaen in Kopje hdngen
gablieben zvdrcn." Joel's monograph, which preceded Pearson's
paper, was published in 1871, but the question of the probable in-
fluences of the Rabbi of Cordova on the excommunicated Jew of
Amsterdam has not yet been resolved, if ever it will be. In 1924
Dr. Leon Roth, of the University of Manchester, published his
engrossing study on Spinoza, Descartes, and ]\Iaimonides, in the
Preface to which he says : "In the following study I have en-
deavoured to show that ( 1 ) in the relation to Descartes, Spinoza
represents the radical opposition of monism to pluralism ; and that
(2) this same opposition, in a precisely similar context and with
identical presuppositions and consequences, is to be found in a work
which on other counts may be shown to have deeply influenced
Spinoza, the Guide for the Perplexed of Maimonides." In conclud-
ing his study, Roth solves for himself the problem by equating the
Ethics and the Guide. "Maimonides and Spinoza speak through-
1 Pearson's essay can be found in Mind, volume VIII. He takes his stand
with Joel and against Sorley. (The latter attacked Joel's position in an article
in Mind, volume V.) But Pearson argues from a knowledge of the Yad
Hachazoko, not of the Moreh Nchuchim. Yet what is said here applies to him
no less than to the others ; for though he quotes different expressions, they
display no more cogency.
The reader might find it to his interest to contrast the present article with
one by Benjamin Ginzburg on "Spinoza and the Jewish Tradition," Mcnorah
Journal, February, 1927.
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out with one \oice,"' he says. "The monism of Spinoza is a (hrect
derivative of the characteristic from which the monotheistic idea,
in opposition to the current m_\thological plurahsm, had assumed in
the mind of ^laimonides. The Guide for the Perplexed, therefore,
is the kev ... to the growth of Spinoza's system in Spinoza's own
mind, comprising as it does both his own positive philosophy and
the grounds of its opposition to and rejection of Cartesianism. . .-
It is not witlun the pro\ince of this essa}- to consider the argu-
ments advanced b_\- either Joel or Roth in support of the position
thev take, to weigh them in the balance of reason and i)ass judgment
on them. It must suffice if we say that whate\'er similarities and
parallelisms they find between the two systems, are likenesses or
agreement only of accident and language, but not of essence. The
Pope speaks of God and the m_\stic speaks of (lod: do the_\- speak
of the same God ? And >et the\' use much the same words in speak-
ing of Him, each describing Him as perfect and good, loving and
iust and merciful. liut is their reference to the same God? The
skv looks blue, and so does water, }et sky is not water. Even so is
it with Spinoza and ]\Iaimonides : to the God of neither can be
ascribed human passions and qualities, but one CJod is Spinoza's and
the other God is that of ]\Iaimonides.
The onlv heritage that Spinoza took from the S_\nagogue is the
term God. and the term onl_\-. Spinoza emptied it of the meaning to
which the thought and life of manifold centuries had made con-
tribution and refilled it with an import all his own. It is from that
act of genius that the remembrance of his name springs: and it is
for that act that his name will be forgotten, but to be recalled again.
In an age when men are torn between their thoughts and emotions,
between, as Unamuno sa_\s, the nay-saying of their minds and the
\-ea-saAing of their hearts, between belief in the most extravagant
catch-at-straws and the shallowest of materialisms, for men of such
an age the gilded phrase of Spinoza's, Dens sk'e Xatiira. ma\- have
its allurement. "God is Nature" or "Nature is God," the>- are apt to
- It is of interest to note that in a later essa}-, called "Jewish Thought in
the Modern World," which appears in The Legacy of Israel (Ox-ford, 1927),
Dr. Roth does not speak wnth so assured a temper. "The contention that
Spinoza is a Jezcish [sic] philosopher," he writes, "Jew'ish, that is, not only
in origin but in inspiration, needs to be limited carefully. 'Spinozim,' it has
been happily remarked [by Pollock], 'is not a system but a habit of mind.'
Now it is this 'habit of mind,' not any specific system of doctrine, which
divergent opinion in the modern world has found valuable in Spinoza, and it
is this 'habit of mind,' again apart from any question of specific doctrine,
which Spinoza derived from the Hebraic tradition."
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say, and autosuggest themselves into a soundless peace. But there
may arise a generation which will not know Coue, and which will
not be satisfied with compromises that are substanceless and con-
ciliations that can quiet only the tongue ; men who will look upon
themselves in no false mirror, who will know that they are consti-
tuted of irreconcilable elements. They will find no content in a
fictional truce, and to them Spinoza's phrase will have a totally
different purport. "Deus SIVE Natura," they will say. There is
God and there is Nature, and the twain are not one. We shall render
unto God what is God's and unto Nature what is its due. It was
Goethe who said, "As a poet, I am a polytheist ; as a naturalist, a
pantheist ; as a moral man, a deist ; and in order to express my mind
I need all these forms." He follows a misleading scent who would
find God by way of science or philosophy. God can be known
only in religion.
Maimonides was a pious man thinking the thoughts of a philos-
opher; Spinoza was a philosopher trying to feel pious. One pre-
sents the spectacle of a man rationalizing his beliefs; the other, of
one trying to believe his thoughts. Maimonides starts with the belief
in a transcendental God which he attempts to translate into logical
propositions; Spinoza starts with logical propositions which he
attempts to vitalize by referring them to
—
" T don't know what you mean by glory; Alice said.
'When / use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said in a rather
scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose to mean—neither
more nor less.'
'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words
mean so many different things.'
'The question is,' said Humpty Dumpt}", 'which is to be
master—that's all.' "
Spinoza, too, like Jacob, strove with God, and it was God who
won—but not the God of the Patriarchs or of Psalms, but the
WORD. Spinoza thought he would vitalize the Universe b}' nam-
ing it God. It became his Schlagzvort. "^letaphysics," \\'illiam
James has said, "has usually followed a very primitive kind of
cjviest. You know how men have always hankered after unlawful
magic and you know what a great part in magic words have always
played. If you have his name or the formula of incantation that
binds him, you can control the spirit, genie, afrite, or whatever the
power may be. . . So the universe has always appeared to the
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natural mind as a kind of enis^nia of which the key must be sought
in the shape of some illuminating or power-bringing word or name.
That word names the universe's principle, 'God,' 'Matter.' 'Reason,'
'the Absolute,' 'Energy,' are so man}- solving names. You can rest
when }ou have them. You are at the end of your metaph}'sical
quest."
By naming the Uni\erse God, Spinoza thought that he therebv
resolves all riddles, answers all queries, makes life worth living bv
setting before man an object which he could love and joy in the
loving. These had been the functions of God for his predecessors,
and being faced b}' problems which had been theirs, too, he offered
the same solution. . . . "Thinking is the attempt to satisfy a special
impulse," said Bradley, "and the attempt implies an assumption
about reality." Even before he became a metaphysician, Spinoza
felt that soiiiehozc the Universe 7}iiist be divine, that man must love
something, and that "we cannot have too much of merriment"—and
the only key to the solution is, God. And so we have "Dens sive
Natura
. .
." But have we, really?
. . .
"Ah, love, let us be true
To one another ! for the world which seems
To lie before us like a land of dreams,
So various, so beautiful, so new,
Hath reall}' neither joy, nor love, nor light.
Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain
;
And we are here as on a darkling plain
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,
Where ignorant armies clash by night."
If the taint of a philosophical system is dependent upon the tempera-
ment of the interpreter, why should Arnold's reaction to the
Spinozistic Universe be less valid than even Spinoza's own?
The basic assumption about the Universe for both Spinoza and
IMaimonides is that it is knowable. To repeat our quotation from
Bradley, "Thinking is the attempt to satisfy a special impulse, and
the attempt implies an assumption about reality." He who assumes
the least and goes the farthest is the greatest philosopher.
But our philosophers did not agree in much else. They soon
reached crossroads and parted compan}-. To Spinoza, in order that
the real be knowable, it must be simple, a unit, and, though infinite,
yet all-inclusive. (Whatever that may mean, I know not.) But
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]\Iaimonides went be}ond this : Nature to be knowable, must be
one : but to be one, it must ha\'e been created b}' One. In other
words, there is a Universe onl\- if there is a God; the I'niverse is;
therefore God is.
The God of ]\Iaimonides is not lie whom the vulgar worship.
AMiat can they know about Him ? Alaimonides cjiiotes the words
of the cynical Preacher: "For God is in Heaven, and thou upon
Earth ; therefore let th}' words be few." Being a rationalist, he
attempts to give religion a rational content, and in so doing in-
advertentl}' empties it of its real burden, and leaves it without a
sufficient reason d'etre. "You must therefore consider the entire
globe as one individual being. . . This mode of considering the
universe is. as will be explained, indispensable, that is to say," says
the Rabbi, "it is very useful for demonstrating the unity of God;
it also helps to elucidate the principle that He who is One has
created only one being."
From His unity we must deduce His incorporeality, for "without
incorporeality there is no unit}', for a corporeal thing is in the first
case not simple, but composed of matter and form [which Pearson,
in another connection, translates as extension and thought, respec-
ti\ely, forgetting, seemingly, that Maimonides is an Aristotelian],
and secondly, as it has extension it is also divisible."
P>ut that God is one and incorporeal are the onl}- things we can
assert of Him and remain rational. As we shall see, we must not
say even that He exists, unless analogically, and "we use 'one' in
reference to God to express that there is nothing similar to Him,
but we do not mean to say that an attribute of unit}' is added to
His essence."
God is the Place of the Universe, l)ut the Universe is not His
place. It is in Him that ever}thing lives, and moves, and has its
being. He is the source of realit}- and as such transcends reality
and is wholl}-other than an}thing known or knowable. We can
affirm nothing of Him except that, in some way. Me is our Greator
and of all we see. "All must be taught," holds Maimonides, "that
there is no similarit}' in an}' way whatsoever 1)etween Him and His
creatures: that His existence is not like the existence of His crea-
tures. His life not like that of an\' living being, His wisdom not like
the wisdom of the wisest of men; and that the difference between
Him and His creatures is not merel}' quantitative, but absolute; I
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mean to sav that all must understand that our wisdom and His, and
our power and His, do not differ quantitatively or qualitatively, or
in a similar manner, for two thing's, of which one is the strong and
the other weak, are necessarily similar, belong to the same class,
and can be included in one definition. The same is the case with
all other comparisons ; they can only be made between two things
belonging to the same class. An\thing predicated of God is totally
different from our attribute : no definition can comprehend both ;
therefore His existence and that of any other being totally differ
from each other, and the term existence is applied to both
homonymously . '
'
Unlike the God of Spinoza, the God of AFaimonides "has no
positive attribute whatever. The negative attributes, however, are
those which are necessary to direct the mind to the truths which
we must believe concerning God ; for, on the one hand, they d(j not
imply any plurality, and on the other, the\' convey to man the highest
possible knowledge of God ; e. g., it has been established b}- proof
that some being must exist besides those things which can be per-
ceived by the senses or apprehended by the mind, when we say of
this being that it exists, we mean that its non-existence is im-
possible."
It is difficult, if not impossible, to grasp ]^[aimonides' meaning
in these words. As has been already pointed out by both Gersonides
and Grescas, he argues as though not—non-existent could possibly
mean anything else than existent, or not-plural anything else but
simple. Perhaps all he means is that we are to take our qualifica-
tions of God as we are to take the myth of the C3.xe in Plato's
Republic: only analogicall}', as imperfect approximations to the
truth. But for the purposes of metaphor, wh\- should positive
assertions be less admissible than negative ones?
Yet, if we are unable to know anything of llis attributes—not
alone because "a boundary is undoubtedly set to the human mind
which it cannot pass," but also because God e.v hypofhesi can haz-e
no attributes—we may, however, know Him by His actions. God
is known by what He does, not by what He is. "This kind of attri-
bute," says Alaimonides, "is separate from the essences of the thing
described, and, therefore, appropriate to be employed in describing
the Creator, especially since we know that these different actions do
not imply that different elements must be contained in the substance
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of the agent, b_\' which the different actions are produced. On the
contrary, all the actions of God emanate from His essence, not
from any extraneous thing superadded to His essence." Fire
bleaches certain things and blackens others, melts and makes hard,
boils and burns ; and }'et fire does not accomplish each of these acts
by a different element or peculiar property, but only by its heat.
As Saint Paul has it, "There are diversities of operations, but the
same spirit."
In this Nlaimonides would be cjuite correct if he had also said
that we could know God as well as we know the nature of fire.
If we did not know that it was the same fire which both melts and
hardens, would it be unreasonable for us to believe that each of
these operations was performed by a different fire, or that it was
from difterent elements in the flame that the different eft'ects fol-
lowed ? Alaimonides posits the unknow^ability of God, like the God-
head of ]\Ieister Eckhart, and then says, "His works give evidence
of His existence, and show wJiat uuist he assuuicd concerning Him,
that is to say, what must be attributed to Him either afiirmatively or
negatively." Can we justifiably assume anything about the cause if
our knowledge is limited solely to the effect? Unless we know that
God produces everything, why can we not say that the thunder
comes from Thor, that rain is sent by Frey, and that our garden
fiow^ers are cared for by Freya and the Elves? From diversity of
operations we may infer a diversitx' of spirits, or a diversity in
spirit; unless, of course, w'e knozu that they all and singularly issue
from one ultimate and simple cause. But to Maimonides the exist-
ence of God is never more than an assumption from which the unity
of Nature incorrigibly follows. However, since God is unknowable,
and "since the existence of a relation between God and man, or
between Him and other things, has been denied"—what is He that
we should be mindful of Him? If God exists, then Nature is one;
but perhaps all the host of Olympvis or of Asgard exist, and Nature
is not simple. It is a rather dangerous business to make one
assumption in order to establish another assumption.
The Universe is knowable and all its ways are reasonable. It
is on this assumption, to them a postulate, that both Spinoza and
Maimonides construct their respective cosmologies. So far do they
agree ; but Maimonides went farther : he would bind even the
Infinite Wisdom—which, by hypothesis, can have nothing in com-
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men with what we call our wisdom,—he would subject even the
Omniscient to our so-called Laws of Reason to what we at present
look upon as Eternal \'erities. "We do not call a person weak,"
he says, "because he cannot move a thousand hundredweights, and
we do not say that God is imperfect because Tie cannot transform
Himself into a body, or cannot create another being like Himself,
or make a square whose diagonal should be equal to one of its
sides . . . there are things which are impossible, whose existence
cannot be admitted, and whose creation is excluded from the power
of God." Even God cannot contradict the Laws of Reason, yet it
is blasphem\' to assert that His reason resembles man's!
In Spinoza the law of thought becomes the law of realit\- : in
]\Iaimonides the law of thought becomes not onl_\' the law of Nature,
but of God, too—though he would be the last to admit it. To view
God sub specie hoinonis, he would sa}', is the greatest of sins.
The answer to the problems our philosophers raise can best
be given in the words of Maimonides himself: "The infinite cannot
be comprehended or circumscribed." Spinoza has as one of his
first definitions that the Real is infinite and consists of infinite
attributes ; but too soon did he forget this and constructed a universe
of which thought and extension alone are attributes. In a universe
which is infinite and includes infinite possibilities, what avails it to
us if we know but one or two of them? Are we made blessed by
the possession of such piece-meal knowledge? Can the sound of
two notes soothe our ears when we know that an entire and endless
symphon}' is being placed, on a cithern and Aeolian harp, viol and
psalter}", dulcimer and Pandean pipes? Fire bleaches and blackens,
that we know and nothing else. But some daA' it mav burn us, and
what then?
L'ltimately was it not the Law of Contradiction that both Spinoza
and ]\Iainionides worshipped, though the former raised an altar to
Substance and the latter to the Prinniiii Mobile:^ Neither called his
god b}' his right name; their religious natures made it ineffable.
"And they shall say unto me. A\'hat is His name? \\'hat shall
I say unto them?" . . . Why, sa}', the Law of Contradiction. . .
"But, behold, they will not believe me, for they will say. The Lord
hath not appeared unto thee."
Creation names Him, say Spinoza and Maimonides ; especially
the mind of man. "Before the L^niverse was created, savs the
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Talmud, "there was only the Almighty and His name." None but
the "little gnostics," of whom Santayana speaks, can undertake to
call Him by His noiiieii proprhim; and the rest of us still believe
that "the infinite cannot be comprehended or circumscribed," that
Life and its Setting overflow the articulate. God is not an hy-
pothesis, but a conjecture, and only in a mystical moment does it
fulfill itself.
It were time that we, too, like the Romans of yore, raise an altar
to the Unknown God—but not in the spirit of Rabbi Moses ben
Llaimon.
